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Introduction
A large number of policy-making decisions rely on the key macroeconomic question of the nature of fiscal policy's impact on the economy. Therefore, it is not surprising that the impact of fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates has been extensively studied in the empirical literature. 1 However, some of the transmission channels between fiscal policy and the macroeconomic aggregates have not been thoroughly investigated; the one relatively under-investigated channel that is the subject of the present paper is the effect of fiscal policy on profits.
The role of profits as a key driving force of capital accumulation and economic activity has been of paramount importance in economic thinking since the time of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. More recently, Abel and Blanchard (1986), Phelps (1994) , Alesina et al. (2002) and Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky (2007) have provided models in which profits play a central role as a determinant of investment and growth. Given the importance of profits in shaping macroeconomic developments, it is surprising that -to the best of our knowledge -the only existing empirical study that investigates the influence of fiscal policy on business profits is the one by Alesina et al. (2002) .
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between fiscal policy and profits. Our approach is novel in the following two aspects. First, following Kneller-Bleaney-Gemmel (1999, 2001 ) (hereafter KBG) our empirical method is based on a full specification of the government budget constraint. KBG outline -their method is explained in the following section -that incomplete specification of the budget constraint results in substantial biases in parameter estimates. Additionally, KBG sub-divide the government budget constraint in a way that allows us to take into account the quality of fiscal policy. On a panel of 22 high-income OECD countries over the period 1970-95 they find that an increase in 'productive expenditures' has a growth enhancing effect, while 'distortionary' taxation hampers economic growth.
Second, although, for reasons discussed in the next section, our empirical analysis is orientated mainly towards the economic classification of expenditures we also investigate the effect of the functional components of public spending on profits. 2 According to the Government Finance Statistics of IMF, government expenditures can be classified along two main lines. The economic classification that divides public spending into capital and current expenditures and the functional classification that serves to distinguish transactions by policy purpose or type of outlay. Some broad categories of the functional classification are transport and communication and healthcare expenditures, each of which includes current and capital expenditures.
We focus our study on 19 high-income OECD countries over the period . Regarding the economic classification of public spending, results clearly indicate that capital expenditures have a positive impact on profits, while the coefficient on current expenditures is statistically insignificant. Even so, when we disaggregate current expenditures we find that wages and salaries expenditures deteriorate profits, while nonwage expenditures have a positive impact on profits. As for the functional components of public spending our results suggest that transport and communication expenditures increase profits, while the opposite holds for defense expenditures. As far as tax variables are concerned, direct and indirect taxation seem to decrease profits. However, a more detailed sub-division of direct taxation indicates that social security contributions have a neutral effect on profits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data, specifies the econometric model and contains our basic findings. Section 3 then reports the results of extensive robustness tests. The last section concludes.
Empirical analysis

Fiscal data
Our fiscal data are obtained from the Global Development Network Growth Database complied by William Easterly. Primary data for the proceeds are taken from Government Finance Statistics -an annual edition of the International Monetary Fund; and the data for GDP from Global Development Finance and World Bank's 'World Development Indicators'. We choose this database since, to the best of our knowledge, it is the most complete database for fiscal elements that compose public spending (economic and functional classification) and revenues (see Appendix for details on data sources and descriptive statistics).
As far as the quality of fiscal policy is concerned, following Aschauer (1989) and Devarajan et al. (1996) , the literature dealing with the growth impact of fiscal policy recognized that one should make a distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' public spending. In general, government expenditure components are classified as productive, if they are included as arguments in the private production function and as unproductive if they are not. Similarly, taxation items can be classified either as direct (distortionary) taxation, if they affect the investment decisions of individuals or as indirect (non-distortionary) taxation if they do not affect the saving/investment decision [see among others Barro (1990) , KBG and Mendoza (1997) ]. Given that allowing for a disaggregation of the government budget constraint along these lines seems to be a promising way forward in the empirical literature on fiscal policy and growth and despite the fact that the classification of certain budget items can be debatable, we try -as much as data availability allows us-to adopt this approach in our analysis. Although, we do not use the a priori classification of government expenditures as 'productive' and Turning to the classification of fiscal data, we sub-divide public spending into capital expenditures and current expenditures. This is our basic classification. Although, later on we examine if any sub-component of current expenditures have an impact on profits, while, alternatively, we experiment with the functional classification of public spending. On the revenue side, we classify revenue as direct (distortionary) taxation, indirect (non-distortionary) taxation and other revenues (as in KBG). 3 Direct taxation includes taxation on income and profits, social security contributions, taxation on payroll and manpower and taxation on property, while indirect taxation consists of taxation on goods and services and taxation on international trade. Additionally, other revenues contain non-tax revenues and other tax revenues (not elsewhere classified). Finally, in our regressions we include the budget surplus (deficit). 4 All fiscal variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP.
Given that, as mentioned in the introduction, our empirical method is based on a full specification of the government budget constraint we will next refer shortly to the relevant argument presented in KBG. 5 Let is initially suppose that we want to include in our empirical analysis all the elements of the budget constraint. In order to avoid perfect multi-collinearity one element should be omitted. At the same time, suppose that we choose to omit from our specification fiscal element X m with estimated coefficient γ m .
This implies that the estimated coefficient γ j for another fiscal element X j , which we include in the estimated equation, will now equal (γ j -γ m ). Consequently, the standard hypothesis test of zero coefficient for the fiscal element X j is in fact testing the hypothesis (γ j -γ m )=0 rather than γ j =0. Therefore, if we want to get unbiased estimates for all fiscal elements, we should exclude from the regression fiscal variables with negligible effect on profits (γ m =0). Regarding the interpretation of results, coefficient γ j measures the marginal impact of fiscal variable X j on profits, net of the marginal impact of fiscal variable X m , which is the assumed implicit financing element.
The profit equation
The empirical literature on the determinants of profits is mainly concentrated in identifying the determinants of sectoral rather than aggregate profits. A relatively large literature has attempted to identify the determinants of profits at the sectoral level using measures of the market value or accounting profits [see among others Schmalensee (1989), McGahan and Porter (2002) ]. The determinants include firm-specific characteristics as well as market structure and industry-specific characteristics. On the 4 Overall budget surplus is total revenues and official grants received, less total expenditure and lending minus repayments. It is worth noting, that in our regressions we do not include the very small components grants for the side of revenues and lending minus repayments for the side of expenditures. This happens for two reasons, first, because these elements reduce our sample significantly and second because when we include them in regressions, they turn out to be insignificantly related with profits. 5 For details see pp. 174-175 of their paper. other hand, the existing literature on the determinants of aggregate profits is rather limited. Finkel and Tuttle (1971) have been the first who have attempted to identify empirically the determinants of aggregate corporate profit margin by using capacity utilization, unit labour cost, inflation and exports. Our first concern is to choose an appropriate profits indicator for our dependent variable. The two main sources of profit data are national account and corporate account data. We use here national account data since they cover the whole economy and are more consistent across countries and time. The national account measure of profits is the gross operating surplus. 7 Specifically, we measure profits as the gross operating surplus (% GDP), defined as GDP less compensation of employees and taxes (minus subsidies) on production, denoted as profits and obtained from the Annual Macroeconomic database of the European Commission. The empirical model we estimate is of the following form:
where M is a set of fiscal variables, Z is the set of 'other' variables that we use to control for country-specific profits related characteristics. Finally, µ i and λ i are country and time specific fixed effects and ε i,t is the error term.
Of course, the inclusion of country and time-specific effects gives us the advantage of controlling for a large part of omitted variable bias. On the other hand, one quite difficult task of this study is to find appropriate control variables for the model specification. This difficulty occurs because this is the first study that attempts to introduce a set of control variables among the regressors in an aggregate profit equation.
In the only relevant paper, Alesina et al. (2002) use as control variables two lags of the dependent variable. Therefore, before including tax-spending variables in our model specification, we experiment with several control variables that intuitively are considered to be important for the determination of aggregate profits. The following control variables seem to have a significant effect on profits:
(a) An indicator of the development of labour cost relative to labour productivity. Instead of using a measure of unit labour cost we construct an excessive wage indicator that we borrow from Malley and Moutos (2006) . We obtain the 'excessive wage' indicator by estimating the regression: (2) for each country 8 using annual data obtained from OECD Economic Outlook database (online version). In the estimated equation, W t is the real compensation per employee and P t is the productivity index. The residuals, η t , estimated in this first step, are the excessive wage variable that we apply in the second step in equation (1). 9 Pagan (1984) show that using residuals generated repressors in a two-step OLS approach, produce consistent and efficient estimators, while valid inferences can be made with the standard errors provided as output from the second step. Furthermore, both Pudney (1982) and Pagan (1984) argue that our results from equation (1) are consistent as long as cov(ε,η)=0. We will examine the validity of this assumption in the next section using the Davidson and MacKinnon test of exogeneity. It is also worth mentioning, that we have attempted to employ in our model specification a series of other control variables. For instance, we included obvious candidates such as the real interest rate or the degree of openness of an economy.
However, these additional control variables did not have a significant relationship with the profit share, while including them in our specification did not change our basic findings.
Our sample spans over the period 1975 to 1999 and includes 19 high-income
OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 10 Given that profits depict a very high cyclicality, we follow the standard approach of constructing 5-year period averages Zealand is dropped due to data unavailability. Finally, Greece has been excluded from the sample as an outlier. Although, there is no theoretical justification for dropping outliers from our sample, it would be of considerable concern if our results where driven by them.
We have detected for the case of Greece that observations for variable profits are laying three standard deviations above the mean (three-sigma rule) 11 , while Hadi's (1992) method identifies them as outliers. 12
Empirical Strategy
In this section we perform a variety of specification tests as proposed by modern econometric analysis for panel data. Results clearly indicate that two-way Fixed Effects specification is the most appropriate to estimate equation (1). We start by employing the Tables 1-6 ) for random effects. The LM test is a test on the variance of the presence of country specific effects, with the null hypothesis indicating no unobserved heterogeneity (µ i = µ in eq.1) and the pooled OLS estimator as the most appropriate approach. For each model specification, the null hypothesis of no unit specific random effects cannot be accepted, which means that we cannot ignore the presence of country-specific effects.
Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test (see test N 1 in
Next, in order to check if between Fixed Effects model and Random Effects
model one is superior to the other, the Hausman test (N 2 ) is performed. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that regressors and the unobservable country-specific random error are uncorrelated. As can be seen, the Hausman test clearly indicates the use of Fixed Effects model, while at the same time we cannot accept the joint insignificance of country-specific characteristics (Prob>F=0.000). It is worth noting, that Fixed Effects are a reasonable way to proceed with panel data, as they always give consistent results, yet they may not be efficient. Baltagi (2005) argues that fixed effects model is an appropriate specification for panel data analysis, when focusing on a specific set of individuals, which fits in our case of 19 high-income OECD countries. It is also important to check, with an F-test (N 3 ), whether time fixed effects should be included in our estimated model. Results strongly suggest the inclusion of time dummies in our regressions.
To continue with, one problem we face when we use the Fixed Effects estimator is the assumption that the regressors included in model specification are not correlated with the error term. In fact, averaging the data allows us to control for a large part of simultaneity in our regressions, while the inclusion of country and time-specific effects give us the advantage of controlling for a large part of omitted variable bias.
Additionally, although, it is very difficult to find appropriate instruments for all fiscal variables, we implement Davidson and MacKinnon exogeneity test (N 4 ) for fixed effects panel or pooled data. A rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors effects on the estimates are meaningful. Our primary objective is to examine the exogeneity assumption for all fiscal variables and the excessive wage indicator. Therefore, initially we consider only tax-spending variables and the excessive wages as endogenous, but gradually we add in endogenous regressors all remaining control variables (except time dummies), without any qualitative difference for our results. Due to space considerations, we present the results when all explanatory variables are considered endogenous. We use as instruments the initial values for each 5-year period average of our sample. As can be seen, results clearly indicate that any endogeneity among the regressors does not affect our estimates. 13 Next, we want to check the statistical properties of our panel, although, we know that when the time length of the panel is small this task becomes particularly difficult.
The first hypothesis to be tested is that errors have equal variance across units (homoskedasticity). For this reason our model is tested by performing a likelihood ratio test (N 5 ), as proposed by Green (2000), of the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity versus the alternative hypothesis of heteroskedasticity across groups. The null hypothesis is strongly rejected, indicating the presence of groupwise heteroskedasticity.
Second, our model is tested for serial correlation arising when error terms for one unit of one year correlate with those of the previous year as well as for contemporaneous correlation implying that error terms for one country correlate with those of another country. Initially, we employ a test of serial correlation (N 6 ) in the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data model, as discussed by Wooldridge (2002), which strongly suggests the presence of first order autocorrelation. On the other hand, we have insufficient observations to test for cross-sectional dependence. One possible solution would be to use Feasible GLS estimator, which corrects for contemporaneous correlation, panel heteroscedasticity, and unit specific serial correlation. Although our qualitative results are not affected, as argued by Beck and Katz (1995), the correction for contemporaneous correlation is problematic unless T is considerably larger than N. Therefore, our estimations include robust standard errors to both heteroskedasticity (Huber-White sandwich estimators) and any form of intra-cluster serial correlation. Since the clusters are countries in our case, this option corrects for intra-country serial correlation.
Finally, an alternative specification of our model would be to include a lagged dependent variable among the regressors in equation (1). Indeed, we employ the difference-generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology (Arellano-Bond (1991)), but we find insignificant coefficient for the lagged dependent variable. 14 Moreover, these dynamic estimators are designed for large N and small T panels, which in our case can lead to severely biased and imprecise estimates. Therefore, although we opt for excluding the lagged dependent variable we believe that our model is properly specified since on the one hand, we take 5-year averages, including time fixed effects and on the other hand, we control for intra-country serial correlation.
Results
We start our analysis by estimating equation (1), using the set of control variables described above. The results are reported in the first column of Table 1A . As can be seen, the coefficient on excessive wage is negative and statistically significant. As the theory predicts, an increase in excessive wage tends to increase the cost of production in business sector putting a downward pressure in the profit share. The reer variable is negative and statistical significant, showing that deterioration in competitiveness of the home country is associated with a fall in the profit share. The coefficient on consumption, on the other hand, is positive and statistically significant, indicating that, as expected, a rise in demand has a positive impact on profits. Finally, unemployment is positively related with profits. This result may suggest that when unemployment is low firms face higher hiring and training cost since quits are procyclical. According to Akerlof et al.
(1988) the opportunities for job switching are significantly greater when unemployment is low than when it is high.
In the second column of Table 1A , we model profits as a function of fiscal variables along with the control variables. As already mentioned, we have to omit one element of the budget constraint in order to avoid perfect multi-collinearity. We initially choose to omit budget surplus (deficit). Our results indicate a neutral effect of total expenditures on the profit share. On the other hand, an increase in taxation is negatively and significantly related to the profit share. In comparison with Alesina et al. (2002) results, we observe that although the coefficient of revenue turns out statistically significant and has the same effect on the profit share, expenditures don't seem to deteriorate profits.
Next, in column 3 of Table 1A , we omit expenditures, which seem to be a neutral financing element, while we include variable budget surplus in order to test our implicit assumption that the coefficient on budget surplus is insignificant. Results for variable revenues remain unaffected, while in line with our initial assumption, the coefficient of variable budget surplus is statistically insignificant. In the fourth column of Table 1A , we exclude from our regression variables expenditures and budget surplus, while revenues still have the same effect on profits. Finally, in the last column of Table 1A , we attempt to mis-specify the budget constraint in order to examine the importance of omitting from our regressions only elements with a neutral effect on profits. As can be seen, the coefficients on variables expenditures and budget surplus, when financed by increased taxation, are negatively biased and statistically significant. This result clearly indicates the importance of omitting only implicit financing elements from our specification. Table 1A here  However, these aggregate results are not "…infrastructure can be a particularly appealing area for state intervention. First, coordination issues are especially important since the infrastructure serves many sectors simultaneously. Second, the projects tend to be large and time-consuming, so that capital market constraints and substantial uncertainty can deter private participation. Third, projects are fairly standard, and hence 'local knowledge' (Hayek 1945) , which is perhaps the main advantage of private entrepreneurs over government, is not as essential as in other activities. Regarding tax variables, direct taxation is negatively and significantly related to profits. An increase in direct taxation, that raises the cost of work relative to leisure Moving one step forward, in the second and third column of Table 1B , we drop current expenditures and other revenues, which are both found to be insignificantly related with the profit share, while we introduce budget surplus. As can be seen, results for capital expenditures, direct taxation and indirect taxation do not change, while, on the other hand, budget surplus is insignificantly related with the profit share. Finally, in the regressions reported in the last three columns of Table 1B we omit the fiscal elements that appear insignificantly related to profits in our previous results. We do not omit from our estimated equation more than two neutral elements of the budget constraint -although this would have no impact on the results-because it would make harder to identify the assumed implicit financing element. As can be seen, once again, results for capital expenditures, direct taxation and indirect taxation remain unaffected.
Robustness Checks
In this section we test the robustness of our results to five changes in the model specification. First, we check if our findings are driven by outlier observations. Second, we use a different indicator to measure profits. Third, we use an alternative set of control variables. Fourth, we proceed into a further disaggregation of the budgetary data. Finally, we investigate the impact of specific functional components of public spending on profits. 15
Testing for outliers
In order to check that our findings are not driven by the presence of outliers, we first reestimate equation (1) by excluding all observations with estimated error in the upper or lower end 5.0-percentile range. This procedure reduces our sample, but it has the advantage of eliminating outlier observations. As expected, the adjusted R 2 of the model is improved by the exclusion of these outlier observations. Results in Table 2 reveal that neither the sign nor the statistical significance of any of the variables has changed though. 16 Alternatively, using Hadi (1992) method we check the fiscal data for outlier observations. Results reveal two outlier observations for variable other revenues (Norway 1990-94, 1995-00), but without any implication for our results. 
Alternative dependent variable
In all preceding analysis we have adopted the gross operating surplus as the indicator to measure profits. At this point, we want to check if our results are sensitive to this definition. For this reason, in this subsection we re-run equation (1) using net operating surplus as the dependent variable. Net (of depreciation) operating surplus (% GDP) is defined as gross operating surplus minus consumption of fixed capital, and denoted as net profits. As can be seen in Table 3 , results remain unaffected for all explanatory variables.
It is also worth mentioning that, although, gross operating surplus is obtained by Annual Macroeconomic database of the European Commission, our results remain unaffected when we alternatively use the same indicator from OECD Economic Outlook database. Table 3 here
Alternative control variables
Next we want to replace control variables that are related with potential bias: Firstly, the use of a generated regressor such as excessive wage implies that measurement errors, e.g., for productivity, will be classified as excessive wage increases. For example, even a purely competitive economy with no excessive wage increases will give non-zero values for the variable excessive wage. For this reason, instead of using excessive wage variable, we include in our model specification the two variables that we used for its construction.
More specifically, we use labor productivity and the real compensation rate, obtained by OECD Economic outlook database and denoted as productivity and compensation, respectively.
Secondly, although we have found that the correlation between the growth rate of consumption and our fiscal variables is low, it is difficult to argue that fiscal policy will not affect the growth rate of consumption. For this reason, we alter the specification by using the initial growth rate of consumption, obtained by World Bank Development Indicators and denoted as iconsumption. We use this measure for two reasons, firstly because is highly correlated with the growth rate of consumption, secondly because is by even less correlated with the tax-spending variables. Note that our results regarding the impact of fiscal policy on profits would not change if we use iconsumption in all our previous estimations. 17 As can be seen in Table 4 , as expected, the coefficient of productivity is positive and statistically significant while variable compensation is negatively and significantly related with the profit share. Finally, the coefficient of 17 We re-estimated regressions in table 4 by replacing excessive wage and consumption one at the time, while leaving all other control variables as introduced in table 1A, without any qualitative difference for our results.
iconsumption is positive but statistically insignificant. As far as the fiscal variables are concerned, they retain their sign and statistical significance, indicating that our results are not sensitive to these changes in model specification. Table 4 here
Full disaggregation of budgetary data
The next change we make to our estimated equation is to disaggregate even further the fiscal variables presented in Table 1B . First, we examine if different components of current expenditures have any particular effect on profits. For this reason we deviate from our previous specification by employing the basic sub-division of current expenditures into goods and services, interest payments and other current expenditures. 18 As before, we omit from our estimated equation budget surplus, which is considered to be the implicit financing element. As can be seen, in the first column of Table 5, As a next step we disaggregate public spending. In the second column of Table 5 variable goods and services is decomposed into wage expenditures and other goods and services. The former includes wages and salaries, while the latter includes all non-wage expenditures. The coefficient on wage expenditures is negative and significantly related with profits at the 10% level. In Alesina et al. (2002) , the negative effect of public consumption on profits is mainly attributed to a 'labour market channel'. For instance, a rise in the public sector's wages and/or public employment will raise private sector's wages and reduce profits. On the contrary, we observe that other goods and services are significantly related with profits at the 10% level probably due to a direct positive demand impact of this category of government spending (e.g. spending on computers) on 18 Other current expenditures are current expenditures other than interest payments and goods and services expenditures. private production. In the last column of Table 5, Regarding the revenue side, direct taxation is broken-down into income taxation (taxation on income and profits) and other direct taxation. In many cases, variable other direct taxation consists entirely of social security contributions. The coefficient of income taxation in the second column of Table 5 is negative and statistically significant. This is an expected result since income taxation will distort labour and capital decisions with a negative impact on the profit share. What is surprising is that other direct taxation, although it represents a different form of direct taxation, is insignificantly related to profits. This result can be explained by the fact that this variable consists mainly by payments for social security contributions that may not be considered by individuals as taxation, but rather as a form of compulsory saving. Table 5 here Table 6 . In particular, in the first column we use the basic specification described above. In columns 2 to 7 each time we exclude from productive expenditures one fiscal element in order to introduce it as a separate variable in econometric specification. For instance, in the second column we extract general public services expenditures (gps) from productive expenditures and we include it as a separate variable in specification. We follow the same procedure in 
Functional vs. Economic classification of expenditures
Conclusions
This paper aims at analyzing the impact of fiscal policy on profits. For that purpose, we estimate a profit equation that takes into account the fiscal policy of the government. In every step of our analysis, we respect the government's budget constraint, while we disaggregate it in a way that allows us to distinguish between productive and unproductive spending on the one hand, and direct (distortionary) and indirect (nondistortionary) taxation on the other hand.
We conduct our empirical analysis for 19 OECD countries during the period 1975-1999. Regarding the non-fiscal variables, we find that profits depend negatively on the part of wages that is not explained by productivity and positively on the growth rate of consumption. As far as fiscal variables are concerned, we observe that a rise in 
